6.
Under such a bill, Puerto Rico might be granted up to six representatives-the number that it would be entitled to as a state. For an explanation of how congressional seats are apportioned, see U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional Apportionment-How It's Calculated, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportionment/calculated.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007 ).
7.
Space constraints limit this Comment's ability to present a systematic defense of Congress's constitutional power to grant Puerto Rico congressional representation by statute. Although such a proposal shares with H.R. 1433 several important constitutional obstacles that merit detailed discussion, this Comment is limited to comparing H.R. 1433 to an analogous proposal for Puerto Rico. For 
i. applying the legal reasoning of h.r. 1433
The most daunting legal hurdle for the sponsors of H.R. 1433 is the text of the Constitution, which stipulates that " [t] he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen . . . by the People of the several States." 8 The bill's detractors claim that the Constitution expressly limits representation in the House to states of the Union. 9 Because the District is not a "State" within the meaning of the Constitution, 10 it arguably should be denied representation in the House absent a grant of statehood or a constitutional amendment.
To counter the textual analysis of detractors, advocates of H.R. 1433 have advanced arguments based on constitutional text and structure as well as judicial precedent. The bill's sponsors argue that the expansive language of the Seat of Government Clause, which grants Congress the power " [t] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
9.
See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 5388, supra note 5, at 17-18 (statement of John C. Fortier). 14. Id. at 12.
15. See, e.g., Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 2000) .
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
ii. on firmer constitutional ground
Although considerable overlap would exist between H.R. 1433 and an analogous bill for Puerto Rico, the latter would avoid some of H.R. 1433's most conspicuous constitutional difficulties.
A. Original Intent
While the Constitution explicitly mandated the creation of the District, 26 it conspicuously failed to provide it with representation. This omission was intentional. The Founders denied self-government to the District in order to protect the federal government from undue external influence.
27 And proposals to extend voting rights to the District were rejected during the Constitution's ratification.
28
By contrast, the Constitution does not present similar roadblocks to extending congressional representation to Puerto Rico. Unlike the District, Puerto Rico was not part of the United States until it was ceded by Spain following the Spanish-American War.
29 Puerto Rico's status as an "unincorporated territory," and its consequent democratic disempowerment, was not a response to an explicit constitutional command, but rather to a twentieth-century distinction created by the Insular Cases 30 that allowed the United States to hold territories as colonies ad perpetuam without the promise 27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (claiming that without exclusive congressional power over the District, "the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity," and that the "dependence of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for protection" would be "dishonorable"). 33 Absent a clear constitutional intent to deny Congress the power to treat Puerto Rico as a state for purposes of representation in the House, the broad language of the Territorial Clause seems at least to provide a clearer source of power to enfranchise nonstate citizens than does the Seat of Government Clause.
In addition, while the Founders acted purposefully in denying federal enfranchisement to the District, they possessed no comparable qualms about extending the same benefits to the territories. In fact, full enfranchisement seems to have been the ultimate goal of territorial expansion for more than a century after the Founding. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 not only guaranteed the existing territories eventual enfranchisement through admission into the Union, but further stipulated that once a territory had "sixty thousand free Inhabitants," it would "be admitted by its Delegates into the Congress of the United States on equal footing with the original States." 34 All U.S. territories acquired between 1787 and the Spanish-American War also achieved congressional representation through statehood.
The evidence therefore suggests that territorial disenfranchisement was meant to be temporary; territories would be held as states-in-waiting. Only the territorial incorporation doctrine devised by the Insular Cases permitted a sharp deviation from prior practice. But holding colonies like Puerto Rico without the possibility of eventual enfranchisement still runs against the very principles upon which the nation was founded and the Constitution enacted. As Judge Juan R. Torruella has asserted, "Indefinite colonial rule by the United States is not something that was contemplated by the Founding Fathers nor authorized per secula seculorum by the Constitution." 35 In the end, extending representation in the House to Puerto Rico would be more consistent with original intent, the Founding spirit, and the principles of territorial expansion. 
B. Structural Concerns
The structural characteristics of the District raise important problems that are absent in the case of Puerto Rico. The District clearly does not possess the most basic attributes of a state
36
: it has no governor and no local legislature analogous to a state legislature, it is not governed by a written constitution, and it is not sovereign over matters not governed by the U.S. Constitution. STATEHOOD (1984) . 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
C. The Twenty-Third Amendment
The Twenty-Third Amendment might also pose significant obstacles to H.R. 1433 that remain inapplicable to an analogous bill for Puerto Rico. In particular, the fact that enfranchising District residents in presidential elections required a constitutional amendment suggests that changes to the District's enfranchisement in federal elections must be made through Article V. However, the Amendment's preclusive effect appears limited to the District, as it does not mention the territories. 49 And while an amendment was arguably necessary to override the Constitution's intentional denial of the District's right to vote in federal elections, there seems to be no analogous constitutional intent to disenfranchise territories ad perpetuam that would require an amendment in the case of Puerto Rico.
50
The effect of the Twenty-Third Amendment on District statehood might also create obstacles to its statutory enfranchisement. In particular, some scholars have suggested that because the Constitution provides for both the creation of the District and for its enfranchisement in presidential elections, District statehood might require a constitutional amendment to repeal the Twenty-Third Amendment and perhaps the Seat of Government Clause.
51 By contrast, statehood for Puerto Rico could be achieved through simple legislation. 52 The different procedural steps necessary to achieve statehood for the District and Puerto Rico may have important implications. Because Congress clearly possesses the power to grant Puerto Rico full enfranchisement through statehood by simple legislation, a proposal to grant representation to Puerto Rico in the House through statute would be procedurally indistinguishable from granting full statehood to Puerto Rico. By contrast, H.R. 1433 would in fact sidestep an otherwise necessary constitutional requirement-namely, the affirmative approval of three-fourths of the states.
53
Congress might thus be precluded from granting to the District through statute what it would otherwise have had to achieve through constitutional amendment. 
iii. normative considerations
Extending statutory representation in the House to Puerto Rico presents an innovative proposal to address Puerto Rico's democratic deficit. While the proposal would not cure completely the island's lack of democratic empowerment, 54 it would grant Puerto Ricans the power to participate in the election of those who govern them and in the formulation of the laws that control their destiny.
The proposal might also break the current political stalemate. It could receive support from both commonwealth and statehood advocates, the two major political forces on the island, because it achieves a long-sought-after goal of statehood supporters-federal enfranchisement-within the autonomic framework of commonwealth status. While such a proposal would fall short of a comprehensive status solution, it could serve as a short-to medium-term alternative to alleviate the most glaring democratic injustice in the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. More importantly, enfranchisement through statute does not foreclose future decolonization avenues. In contrast to a grant of statehood or a constitutional amendment, such a statute would be repealable by another federal statute, permitting Congress and Puerto Ricans to readdress the issue at a later time.
While a proposal to extend statutory enfranchisement to Puerto Rico might be challenged as inconsistent with Puerto Rico's status as an unincorporated territory, 55 this claim does not present a significant barrier. The doctrine of territorial incorporation is traditionally described as differentiating territories in which the Constitution applies in full from those in which only the Constitution's fundamental provisions apply. 56 statutory representation in the House will not transform the island into an incorporated territory because the Supreme Court has held that incorporation will not be presumed absent unambiguous congressional language.
58
In addition, while Puerto Rico's exemption from federal income taxation 59 could raise political resistance to the proposal, the island's tax treatment does not create constitutional difficulties or raise insuperable normative concerns. First, there is no constitutional requirement making enfranchisement contingent on taxation. In any event, Puerto Ricans currently do pay federal taxes: they are subject to federal payroll taxes, 60 and they are not exempt from federal income taxes on U.S. and foreign-source income.
61 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote and its importance as the link between a citizen and her government.
62
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which abolished the poll tax, expresses a general disfavor of conditioning the franchise on the payment of taxes. Puerto Ricans are also as deserving of the right to vote as state citizens: Puerto Ricans, like their stateside counterparts, possess U.S. citizenship, contribute to the U.S. Treasury, and serve in the U.S. military. In the end, the extension of federal taxation to Puerto Rico presents a policy decision for Congress. 63 Ultimately, recognition of Congress's power under the Territorial Clause to create innovative and flexible alternatives within the U.S. constitutional framework presents new opportunities for the resolution of Puerto Rico's status dilemma. Such recognition would broaden the available status options, permitting the United States and Puerto Rico to craft solutions not only consistent with democratic principles, but also adaptive to their particular needs and idiosyncrasies. It would allow the present Commonwealth relationship to achieve a greater degree of democratic legitimacy without sacrificing the economic, social, and cultural benefits of autonomy. PUERTO RICO (1996) .
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